American Hero:
Detectives, Nomads, Artists, and the Future of Empire
America is a remarkable place; this nearly everyone seems to agree on, especially Americans.
One of the magical things about the present moment is the ability one has to instantly reach out across the earth, and see videos of nearly every kind of people under the sun. Not merely manufactured Hollywood versions, not merely posed photographs for adventurers or anthropologists, but the real thing: Amazonian tribespeople, Bedouin herdsmen, Papa New Guineans, Zulus, merely living their lives, wearing their clothes, cooking their food, doing their dances, every exotic sight that Europeans once colonized and conquered and killed to be able to see and gawk at and exhibit and anthropologically analyze. And in every such authentic, native sight, one can see these people holding smart phones.
The implications of this are vast, and in a sense unimaginable. There has never before been a cultural phenomenon quite like this, of so many peoples and languages and religious and anthropological ways of life brought into contact through a highly particular linguistic and cultural and economic and technological matrix.
This has effects everywhere: and in the last century produced at times a very potent kind of existential terror throughout the world. In the nightmare visions of Jean Baudrillard, a deeply French and European thinker if ever there was one, the European dream of liberation was achieving its end in total, eternal hegemony: the creation of an infinite space of interchangeable symbols, where all particularity and singularity would be overcome by uniformity and exchange, all meaning and value negated in their own sign. We would no longer be Frenchmen or Arabs or Bantu or Mongos: we would no longer even be human beings, individuals, persons: our dreams and desires, lives and deaths, would simply be simulations.
Baudrillard's vision found its complement--as he himself occasionally acknowledged--in the spontaneous backlash to "Americanization" in the rest of the world: a backlash emerging from nearly every angle, anti-capitalist, anti-colonialist, Leftist, reactionary, religious-conservative and indigenous-cultural and nationalist movement, every ideological or economic or cultural movement of any kind, anywhere in the world. When Pope Francis spoke of the dangers of "ideological colonization," he was referencing a tradition more than a century old, one that had born fruit around the world, both within and outside the Catholic Church: and in his Magisterial social teachings, he gave this tradition perhaps its most eloquent form to date.
Yet, in the year 2025, it is hard not to feel that something has changed, something so fundamental that it threatens to render this entire century or more of discourses simply obsolete. This change is, depending on how one sees it, either the final triumph of this tradition, or its total annihilation, or its transformation into something different still, and perhaps less strange.
Since I first travelled to Europe at the age of 11 and encountered Frenchmen eating McDonalds and arguing about George W. Bush, I have been pondering this mystery, day by day and hour by hour, thinking about it, in one form or other, in nearly every waking moment, even dreaming about at night. What I encountered in France was not just France, but America: but an America even stranger to me than anything foreign could ever be.
This was not the America of the places where I grew up, the overshadowed valleys of Birmingham, AL, not the America where my mother grew up, the intensively settled, social and familial world of the Appalachian hills and farms of Eastern Ohio, not the America of my Jewish relatives in New York or Florida or Ohio, no America that I ever found at anytime in any place, but the thing that somehow unimaginably ruled them all, that even Americans, I suddenly realized, related to as something distant, something foreign, emerging not from their hearts or souls or lives, but from somewhere infinitely far away, a placeless place, a desert.
And in that time, I have gone back and forth, many times, between rival images of what I was seeing, rival images of just what this infinitely foreign America truly was.
The most obvious answer to the riddle is merely that America is an Empire: the greatest Empire the world has ever seen. This Empire, like all great Empires, was not merely the rule of a certain kind of settled people over another, but of an essentially manufactured breed, a homo imperialis, moving among over all peoples, including my own, with the self-assurance and strangeness of shepherds among sheep. It was not that the farmers of Coshocton, OH were ruling over the herders of Afghanistan and the townsmen of Strasbourg: there was a certain kind of people ruling over all of us, who in all of our native places had come and established their military bases and depots and arrayed their tools and entertainments.
Wandering France in trains, and finding everywhere intensively social, intensively political, intensively French people full of outrage and discourses and opinions about the American President, the first impulse of most Americans, I think, is merely confusion. It is only when I realized that he was their President too that the picture started to come into focus.
Still, this Empire was in a genuine sense American: and as an American, I was in some ways a beneficiary of the overwhelming, iconic power of its culture, its entertainments, its projected image of itself. Resources were taken from the ancient, settled peoples and transferred to places closer to me: to the towers and shopping malls and Internet hubs I could see emerging all around me, as if pulled out of the aether. The homo imperialis overseeing all this was a manufactured breed, true, but he was made mostly from people like me, or at least sorts of people familiar to me, so that in a sense I could understand it better than most, was closer to its cultural nexus, than a Frenchman or an Indian or an Indonesian.
Everywhere I have been in the world, I have been mistaken for this kind of person, or at least compared to it. A beautiful Italian woman told me, with delight, that I looked like an American: a Romanian man told me, with an odd disappointment, that I did not. I have been in American-themed restaurants in Greece and Italy, with pictures of Marilyn Monroe and Elvis and scrawled English text on the walls, and in them eaten food that in no way resembled American food, but was in a sense trying to resemble it.
In a sense, this is nothing new. There is always a glamor and attraction and in the proper sense charisma to Imperial power to the people ruled over it: there is always a drive to adopt the language and culture and way of life that has in some mysterious sense enabled one people to rule over another.
It is too often forgotten today, in a very different climate, that at its height, the American Empire had not only a breed of bureaucrats, not only an exported culture, but a certain, highly potent political legitimacy. Frenchmen denouncing George W. Bush still praised America's salvation of France in WW2, still instinctively related the French Revolution to the American Revolution, saw our President as their own not merely in power, but via some genuine political relationship.
It is hard, today, to convey precisely the sense of outrage that greeted American denunciations of French perfidy over the Iraq War: the sense, not at all of America as a hated foreign power, but as a betraying friend, almost an unfair parent. What struck me even at the time was the overwhelming gap between the reality of this outrage and the way in which it had been described to me via mass media while in America. There was nothing at all in it of the sneering disdain that all Europeans, in American art, are supposed to show for the simple and sturdy pioneers. It was in truth the exact opposite: an outrage of admiration, the disappointed anger of someone finding their moral exemplar going on the spree, going off the rails, betraying not just your principles but their own.
Most puzzling of all was the sense of betrayal, betrayal of a relationship that I had never known or imagined we had with anyone else. This was not the annoyed regard of a servant or distant cousin, but the outraged feelings of an abandoned spouse, complaining not that we were imposing on them but that we were disavowing them, renouncing them, refusing to recognize just how much the French were truly bound to us, how much their own actions and reactions were for our own benefit, how much they belonged to us, how deeply and completely they loved us.
I can still remember an older Frenchmen, born and raised in WW2, weeping as he told us that, while Americans might think that the French had forgotten how we had saved them from the Nazis, how they might think they were being ungrateful in not supporting the Iraq war, the French had not forgotten, would never forget, would never cease remembering their debt to us, their friendship with us.
I wonder at what stage the truth dawned on that man that it was we who had forgotten; or rather, who had never remembered. I wonder at what stage the rest of the world realized how little they truly meant to us.
And yet...I feel, deep in my bones, that this picture has changed since I first went to Europe: that everything has changed. A strange coldness has settled over the eyes of Europeans when they contemplate America. Their feelings are no longer the feelings of an abandoned spouse, a betrayed friend, but something far more distant. When they look at the American President, they no longer feel he is their own.
This is not merely, or primarily, a cultural change. With the rise of the Internet, the rest of the world has in a sense grown far closer to America and Americans; the average person in France or Thaliand has seen far more American films, American videos, heard more American jokes, watched more American porn, engaged far more directly with American politicians, and argued with far more Americans on Twitter, than ever before.
Yet I cannot help feeling that the gig is up, that the trick has been seen through: that they have realized, one and all, not only that American President never cared about them, that American politics and culture were never really their own, but that Americans were never really worthy of their admiration at all. In the age of the Internet, American cultural and political power has merely become a technique, a technology: one eagerly adopted by ordinary people and elites the world over. In the age of the Internet anyone can put out a video of themselves cooking or reviewing movies or having sex: anyone can be an American. They have seen through the magic trick, in the way that all children inevitably do when they realize they can do it just as easily themselves.
In truth, I think there was always both more and less to American power than it seemed at its height. In the year 2025, America is in a sense more powerful than ever. Peoples the world over, even more than in 2003, want America to be powerful, want the American President to tell them what to do, to negotiate their treaties for them, to make their trade deals for them, to make movies for them, to run the Internet for them, to manage the global market for them, to sell Kentucky Fried Chicken to them. Yet there is a cynicism to it all that to me is somehow more shocking. The glamor is gone: the admiration is gone: the legitimacy is gone: the love is gone.
What is true in 2025 of most of the world looking at America is something much harsher than any hatred or disdain: that the world simply does not see an alternative to America.
When I look across the world, and see everywhere the ancient, settled peoples of the world possessing and using American commodities to speak to each other and buy and sell and entertain themselves--when I look across the world, and see everywhere the ancient, settled peoples of the world using the American language as a means of trade and diplomacy across ethnic and national divides--when I look across the world, and see everywhere the ancient, settled peoples of the world using the techniques of American politics and culture and business and social media and military technology to rule over their populations--a strange, creeping feeling comes over me, and the image shifts, and the angle changes almost imperceptibly, and I no longer see America at all. I forget that there ever was such a thing as America: and I begin to think that they have forgotten too.
What is true for the rest of the world is true, to a much greater degree, for Americans themselves--that strange, perpetually shifting melange of peoples out of which the homo imperialis has been manufactured.
Whatever American power means for the rest of the world, for Americans the question of what America means is neither economic nor political, but existential.
But since he went a fever of homelessness will often shake me. I am troubled by rainy meadows and mud cabins that I have never seen; and I wonder whether America will endure.
In 2025, the question of what America is for the rest of the world is intimately bound up with the question of what America is for Americans, what it is in itself and for itself. Indeed, I think that in the deepest sense the latter question is dependent on the former: what America is in the future depends more on what the rest of the world makes of America than what America makes of itself.
It is the belief of Europeans, of Chinese, of Mexicans, of Bedouin and Vietnamese and Iranians and Nigerians in America that has sustained and fed Americans' faith in themselves throughout history: and never more than now. That faith has been lost again and again throughout American history; and in the year 2025 exists perhaps less than ever before. And in a way nearly unique among historical cultures, America without faith in itself simply cannot endure.
Aristotle was a very smart man, and like all very smart men said a lot of incredibly stupid things: but the smartest thing he ever said is the one most objected to by most moderns, namely that the telos, the purpose, the intention, the end, the goal, the final cause, is always and everywhere and for everything the cause of causes, the preeminent thing that makes a thing what it is. This is really, even profoundly true: and never truer than about societies and cultures and cities and nations and Empires. What defines a people is what it is aiming at.
For Aristotle, a state's purpose is supposed to be simple one: the self-sufficient prosperity and health and virtue and happiness of its people. In this sense, America is not, and never has been, a state. Like a few other great Empires throughout history, it has always aimed at something quite different, more tenuous, but infinitely more exciting: an ideal, an image, a way of being.
Chesterton said that America was a nation with the soul of a Church: which raises the question of just who, exactly, this Church is supposed to be worshipping. American intellectuals right and left have for the last sixty years or so said that America was a proposition nation, defined by assent to certain ideas, certain beliefs: but they have rarely agreed on just what those beliefs are.
I have come to believe something rather particular. I agree that America as a political and cultural project has always been held together by a goal, an ideal, a belief: but I do not think it has for centuries really been a belief in liberalism, or human equality, or even utopian social organization.
Hence the thesis of this essay: that America, at least since the 19th century, has been most bound together by a religion: and that religion is a cult of heroes.
I really think that if one were to really understand the image of the American Hero, one could deduce, as if by magic, nearly everything that makes America as a project unique and powerful in history--even deduce, to a degree, its likely fate. And that is the goal of this essay.