Orthodox Schism, Orthodox War

Orthodox Schism, Orthodox War 

I have written a great deal on this blog before over the Orthodox Schism between Moscow and Constantinople, which was for several years one of the biggest Christian news stories in the world and one of the least reported on or discussed. In the last year, however, this story has mutated in ways that would have been impossible to predict, entirely because of the war between Russia and Ukraine. 

(If you have no idea what I'm talking about in regards to an "Orthodox Schism," I suggest you go and read this helpful explainer I wrote at the time of the initial break).

Put simply, the war has transformed the schism and now looks to extend it so far that global Orthodoxy is now perhaps on the verge of dissolution.

As I chronicled here, the early years of the Schism--once the OCU had been formed and Moscow had broken all communion and ties with Constantinople--featured increasingly extreme and increasingly ineffective efforts by Moscow to gain the allegiance and support of other autocephalous churches in the presumed hope of some form of sanction or excommunication of the Patriarch of Constantinople. After the general failure of these efforts and increasing successes by Constantinople in getting autocephalous churches to recognize and enter into communion with the OCU, Moscow shifted tactics decisively towards aggression and attempts to divide the other churches from within. 

Even in the first phase, Churches that entered into communion with the OCU saw the ROC break off all ties with them--increasingly, though, Moscow began to aim at internal division of these Churches, selectively breaking communion with some bishops while retaining others. This culminated in the decision in January of this year to create an entirely new schismatic offshoot of the Greek Patriarchate of Alexandria under Russian control--an act without precedent in modern Orthodoxy.

Meanwhile, however, while Moscow had largely failed in its efforts to gain the support of other autocephalous churches out of Eastern Europe, it had succeeded within Ukraine to a much greater degree than most observers would have predicted. The new independent, Constantinople-sanctioned "Orthodox Church of Ukraine" had suffered from significant growing pains, including problems caused by its relatively young and inexperienced leadership, the loss of its main political sponsor Petro Poroshenko, disappointment with the merely metropolitan and not Patriarchal status granted by Constantinople, and a painful internal schism that drew away many adherents. The old Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, meanwhile, had reasserted itself strongly thanks to its seasoned episcopal leadership, the loyalty of its believers, and a massive infusion of cash from Moscow, challenging the transfer of parishes, making the government step back from open support for the OCU, and rapidly building new parish buildings to replace their losses.

By earlier this year, then, the Schism seemed to be cementing a new longterm status quo, ending in what was more or less a draw on the initial terms of the conflict. Constantinople had succeeded in retaining its position as primary leader and point of contact for most autocephalous churches, fending off the clumsy Russian attempts to claim the status of alternative leader of global Orthodoxy; the ROC, meanwhile, had succeeded in retaining the key dioceses and parishes in Ukraine necessary for it to continue being the dominant force by population in Orthodoxy. Both had suffered significant losses--Constantinople in the loss of its ability to speak for and act in relation to the roughly half of all Orthodox believers in the ROC and in the dividing and diminishment of already-weak autocephalous Churches in the Middle East and Africa and Europe, Moscow in the halving of its parishes and population in Ukraine and the loss of positive contacts with most of the rest of global Orthodoxy--but both had retained the things most essential to their continuing existence. So it seemed it would proceed for the foreseeable future.

Then, of course, the Russian government invaded Ukraine.

An Apologia for American Evangelicism

An Apologia for American Evangelicism

There is a great need for narratives of the present and recent past that are not simply based on mass media or partisan politics.

The problem with most narratives of the recent past is that they are typically based on nothing--neither small-scale empirical experience reflected upon over time nor large-scale rational analysis of trends over time--and they are even more typically driven by unexpressed, hidden external goals: to win elections, get back at family members, salvage projects, denounce enemies, win arguments, and/or "own the libs."  Direct experience, even anecdotal experience, is extraordinarily valuable--so that in that way at least recent history is the ideal kind of historiography--but it becomes far more valuable when reflected upon and placed into a broader context, and not merely thrown into a blender with "other stuff" and served cold as one soggy inedible mass.

Economic history has made something of a comeback over the last decade, as incoherent, disorganized Leftism and increasingly organized Labor have had a general resurgence. It is still very much needed, however, and still very much not the norm. Religious history remains much rarer, and is just as much needed.

The history of American Evangelicism will prove, I think, to be one of the most important accounts for understanding the last roughly fifty years of American political and social history. But that history will have to leap over many high hurdles to make it into existence. At the present moment, accounts and analyses of Evangelicism are not wanting, but mostly come from (1) the crowing hatred of its partisan enemies, who have never understood it but have been growing ever more enraged by being defeated by it for so many decades, (2) the disdain and contempt of its natural enemies, the upper classes, the academics, the intellectuals, who always despised it but understand it now no better than they did in the '80s, and finally (3) its own former adherents, the "exvangelicals," who hate it and blame it as only disappointed sectarians can, for many genuine sins, but also for falling short of their current sectarian causes and failing to establish the utopia they were promised.

Evangelicism is, to say the least, no longer popular. Not only that, but it is increasingly, oddly obscured in the public and political world and mass media, as though it were entirely a thing of the past--except for among the exvangelicals, who speak of it like John Birchers of the United Nations, trying to constantly warn everyone of its crimes and its conspiratorial plots and its sole responsibility for all the problems of the world.

Yet for all that, it is simply true that the Evangelical movement was one of the most important religious and cultural and political events in America since WW2--and that things would have been, would be, very different without it.

This essay, then, is, if not an apologia in a strong sense, simply a basic, analytical theory of Evangelicism that places its nature in a broader context, and so works against accounts of it as a bizarre, uniquely wicked aberration. 

Technological Criticism

Technological Criticism

To be unable to criticize technology is to be insane. This particular kind of insanity is the hallmark of modern society.

Allow me to justify the preceding statements. 

The Logos of Techne

It is difficult to think of a word for what we call "technology" in any ancient tongue or culture. In fact, it occurred to me recently that the word is rather bizarre in itself--something approaching a contradiction in terms. Logos and techne were fundamental categories to the Greeks and especially the Greek philosophers, but they existed in strong contradistinction to each other. Logos is the realm of knowledge, of discourse, of accounting for a particular reality, whether by means of abstract philosophy, mathematical calculation, or narrative. Techne, in contrast, is the realm of craft, of skilled practice aimed at creation and action.

It is by this time a very old intellectual-history commonplace to point to the connections between magic and technology, even to say, as C.S. Lewis did, that the main or only distinction between magic and technology is that one worked, and the other did not. There is truth in this, but it is nonetheless somewhat deceptive. Techne or craft in the pre-modern sense is in fact closely allied to magic, precisely because by its very nature it defies logos in the sense of pre-determined abstraction and calculation. The magician is a practitioner of a craft, but like many pre-modern craftsman, his craft cannot be neatly set out in a mathematical simulation or technical manual; he operates on a mixture of innate skill, honed practice, habit, planning, improvisation, and technique. Wizardry operates on the guild system, with masters and apprentices; there is no magical proletariat. Books of spells or alchemical texts read much like the Byzantine recipes for paints and metal alloys that I translated earlier this year: succinct sets of directions for already skilled and practiced craftsmen to achieve practical ends, given in imprecise proportions, with many options and lots of freedom to alter and experiment baked in.

Technology, though, is not techne. It is not a skill inhering in a skilled laborer operating on technique and instinct beyond the realms of abstract knowledge and calculation. It is, by its very nature, totally calculated and determined in advance, through the distinctively modern and scientific obsession with applied mathematics. 

Neither, though, is technology logos in the general sense of that word. Plato in many of his dialogues provides what could be rather more fittingly described as technologies: that is, rational accounts of techne in general and its particular species, describing their rational ends, the skills involved, and how to become a better practitioner. Technology, while totally calculated, is aimed emphatically at merely practical and immediate ends; it is rarely analyzed in philosophical or moral terms, and no practitioner of technology would regard such analysis as essential to its nature or operation.

The Catholic Church and Coercion

The Catholic Church and Coercion

For the last five years or so, the American Catholic Internet-o-sphere has been awash with discussion and debate over "integralism," or more broadly over the political doctrines of the Catholic Church. I have been following these debates closely, and have a great deal of respect for participants on many "sides." However, I have been consistently annoyed by the failure of many participants to define one key term that comes up again and again in these debates.

This term is "coercion."

If one reads, as I have been doing, D.C. Schindler's recent book on Catholic political theory (based in turn on his father DL Schindler's excellent scholarship), one discovers that his central disagreement with the "integralists" is his insistence, following Dignitatis Humanae and Vatican 2, that certain forms of religious coercion must be excluded. Or, if one reads the "integralist" Thomas Pink's scholarship on Dignitatis Humanae, one finds that the heart of his (polemical) argument, following Leo XIII and the 19th century magisterium, that the Catholic Church is not a voluntary, but a "coercive" society with the right to apply punishments and sanctions to her children to compel them to keep their baptismal promises. Or, again, if one reads the great Pater Edmund Waldstein, the modern originator of the term and base definition of "integralism," one likewise finds an insistence, along with a genuine concern for the dangers of religious coercion, on the necessity of stronger societal and pastoral coercion for the salvation of souls. Or, again, if one reads many of the less interesting enemies and alies of "integralism," one finds on the one hand a visceral disgust at, and on the other hand a gleeful exulting in, the idea of religious coercion as such. From such debates, one could get at times the (absurd) idea that the heart of these disagreements lies in the simple question of whether or not the Catholic Church can ever apply coercion to any people under any circumstances--or the (even more absurd) idea that "coercion" is a simple and univocal concept.

But what is coercion?

We Are All Fascists Now

We Are All Fascists Now

The funny thing about contemporary American politics is that everyone seems to watch and read news constantly but no one actually seems to process and remember it.

The President of the United States traveled to a historical patriotic site and delivered a rousing speech, on the eve of an important election to rally the base against his radical, violent opponents, miscreants opposed to American Democracy and all the principles and values and traditions this country is based on: freedom, liberty, truth, and justice for all. Accompanied prominently by members of the military, he described these monsters' wicked refusal to accept their election losses and willingness to resort to political violence and rioting and conspiracy--in the process demonizing and committing acts of violence and intimidation against law enforcement and government officials. Most fundamentally, he accused them of doubting the essential goodness of America and the American people and the American government and openly denying the crucial dogma that "America is the greatest nation on earth" by attacking the heroes and accomplishments of American history and tradition. To support these people and their beliefs and their efforts, the President declared, was to attack the very basis of American identity and Democracy and so for all intents and purposes to cease to be an American. Against this existential threat, the President promised to fight with all his might and all the power of the American government and law enforcement--so long, of course, as you vote for him and his party in the upcoming elections. 

(ahem)

Yes, I'm of course talking about President Trump's July 4th, 2020 Mount Rushmore rally against the "Radical Left" and Black Lives Matters protesters.

And yes, I'm also talking about President Biden's September 1st, 2022 Philadelphia speech against "MAGA Republicans" and Stop the Steal protesters. 

The similarities between the two speeches show, more clearly than anything else could, that we have entered into a new phase of American electoral politics: one absolutely defined by (1) a widespread crisis of legitimacy, (2) an incoherent, reactionary, nationalism, and (3) the amoral appeal to State power and violence against one's enemies. 

To recognize this symmetry is not to hold that the two sides are simply the same, in fundamental beliefs, principles, or goals. It is rather to acknowledge that, at least in mass-media electoral politics, both sides are responding to the same basic circumstances, and being shepherded, to the degree that each side loses its principles and is led and embodied by incoherent amoral media figures like Trump and Biden, toward the use of the same methods in response to these circumstances. 

Mini-Art-Criticisms: Star Wars, Fellowship of the Ring, There Are Doors, Star Trek The Motion Picture

Mini-Art-Criticisms: Star Wars, Fellowship of the Ring, There Are Doors, Star Trek The Motion Picture

[I am experimenting with various formats in this column as I continue to be quite busy (and also because experimenting with various formats is what this column is all about). This week, I decided to collect some thoughts on a few books and films I have read/watched recently.]

In the last week or so, I have read the following books in their entirety, and watched the following films. The latter is a bit unusual, as I rarely watch films these days. Nonetheless, it occurred to me that they really dovetail in various ways quite nicely.

Hilary of Poitier's Argument For Human & Divine Equality

Hilary of Poitier's Argument For Human & Divine Equality

[I was a bit under the weather and very busy this week, so instead of taking the time and effort to flesh out one of my existing column ideas, I decided to just write up what I've been immediately thinking about lately. As it turns out, I've been thinking a lot about Hilary of Poitier's doctrine of equality.

Hilary of Poitiers is a Doctor of the Church of the 4th century AD, known mostly for his stand against Arian doctrine. He played a big role in my dissertation, and ever since then, I've been fascinated by his concept of (human and divine) equality, which he makes absolutely central to both his theology and anthropology. Since then, I've been working on a paper on the topic, and trying to puzzle out both his essential argument, and especially what his sources and influences might have been. I haven't solved the latter one quite yet, but I thought it might be helpful to try to flesh out and write out in my own words what I take to be his essential argument and definition of equality. 

(It's sad to think how many people in the modern world don't realize that the centrality of equality in Christianity and modernity ultimately traces back to 4th century Trinitarian theology in general and Hilary of Poitiers in particular!) 

The below, then, is based on Hilary's work, especially De Synodis, with a smattering of De Trinitate, Ad Constantium, and In Constantium; it includes a few quotations from De Synodis at key points. However, while I believe the main arguments and conclusions are Hilary's, it also includes my own attempt to think through the implications and possible additional arguments and defenses for his concepts. Probably no one will find this interesting, but I enjoyed writing it. Ora pro nobis!]

I. That All Human Persons Are Equal, and Are Defined by Relations of Equality

(1) Postulate: The fundamental, basic category of experience and philosophical reflection is res: that is, "a thing" or "a reality." 

(2) Postulate: res can only be spoken of and made the subjects of philosophical thought to the extent that they exist and are rationally comprehensible.

(3) Argument: "Essentia (=ὀυσία, essence), and natura (=φύσις, nature), and genus (=γένος, natural kind), and substantia (=ὑπόστασις, substance), are able to be predicated of every res whatsoever."

(4) Definition: "An essentia (=ὀυσία, essence), is a res which exists, or it is those things from which a res exists, especially a res which stably exists (subsistit=subsists) in that which is enduring. Most properly, however, a res is called essentia insofar as it always exists." (De synodis 12)

That is to say, essentia designates a thing, a reality, insofar as it truly exists, and therefore insofar as it endures stably and in an orderly and knowable fashion over time. In particular, it describes a res insofar as it is either actually capable of, or at least tends toward, perpetual, ongoing existence. All res that possess essentia therefore in some sense tend towards perpetual existence.

(5) Definition: "The res, therefore, is also a substantia, because it is necessary that the res which it is should stably exist (subsistit=subsists) in itself." (De synodis 12)

That is to say, substantia (=ὑπόστασις, substance) designates a thing, a reality, insofar as it stably exists in and of itself. In this sense, substantia is not strongly distinguished from essentia: both designate a res insofar as it exists stably in such a way as to tend toward perpetual existence, with essentia describing this in terms of being and substantia laying the emphasis on stability and enduringness and their containment within the res itself.

(6) Definition: "Whatever stably exists, without a doubt is enduring in its genus or natura or substantia. When, therefore, we speak of essentia in order to signify nature or natural kind or substance, we understand them as belonging to that res which always stably exists in all these things." (De synodis 12)

Genus, natura, and substantia, then, are all essentially aspects of essentia, ways of designating and further describing those aspects or elements of a res by which it is enabled to exist stably in a way tending toward perpetual existence.

(7) Context: From among these terms, focus in on natura (=φύσις, nature). The Greek φύσις is etymologically tied to concepts of "birth" or "origination," as well as to broader ideas of "growth," "life," "movement," "springing up" (a la plants), and so forth. Natura, however, is derived from the more limited Latin word nascor="to be born, to be produced, to be procreated."

In speaking of natura, then, Hilary specifically intends to zero in on the aspect of a res's continuing existence that are tied to origination in general and procreation in particular. 

(8): Argument: Among those aspects of essentia that allow a res to exist stably in a way tending toward perpetual existence, central to many of our experience is the fact that the res was itself procreated by a res of the same genus and natura, and it in turn possesses the capability of procreating another res of the same genus and natura. 

(8.1) This is especially important for res like animals or human beings existing in time, and so in at least some aspects impermanently. 

(8.2) For res such as these, without procreation, in a very short time there would be no animals or human beings in actual existence, and so by necessity human being and animal would not be rationally comprehensible or knowable res.

(8.3) Furthermore, without procreation, humans and animals would be fundamentally temporary and transitory res, not in any genuine way tending towards perpetual existence, and so not describeable in terms of concepts like essentia and substantia. These res would not, therefore, truly subsist, and therefore they would fail to exist and to rationally knowable in a fundamental sense.

(8.4) Procreation is therefore metaphysically essential to the existence of these res, and possibly of all res.

(9) Argument: The process of procreation consists of two necessary elements: two entities who are truly distinct, of which one originates the other, and also a single natura which endures through the process of procreation and is shared in toto by both entities.

(9.1) If the two entities were not truly distinct, there would be nothing to distinguish natura from the simple enduring existence of an entity in itself designated properly by substantia. 

(9.2) If the two entities were not truly distinct, then it would be logically impossible, as happens in our experience, for one of the entities to die and cease to exist, and the other to continue existing.

(9.3) Hence, if the two entities were not truly distinct, then procreation would be absolutely useless in ensuring the continuing existence of the res and its tending toward perpetual existence. 

(9.4) If, on the other hand, nothing endured or continued to exist through the process of procreation, then procreation would have no relevance for the essentia of the res, and the res would therefore fall afoul of (8) and no longer truly exist or be rationally comprehensible.

(9.5) That the natura is shared in toto by both entities follows self-evidently from the definition of the term (see 10 below).

(10): Definition: Natura designates precisely that aspect of a res which stably exists and endures through the process of procreation.

(11) Argument: Natura must include all substantial and essential and generic properties possessed both by the progenitor and the natural kind as a whole.

(11.1) We in fact find, in our experience, that the offspring of a particular member of a natural kind is of the same natural kind as its progenitor. The child of a human being is a human being, the offspring of a cat is a cat, the offspring of a horse is a horse, and so on.

(11.2) If natura in the offspring lacked any property essential to the progenitor's own existence as a substantia and essentia, then again, procreation would not in fact extend the stable, substantial existence of the res and, per (8), that res would lack substantial existence and not be rationally comprehensible.

(11.3) If natura in the offspring lacked any property essential to its existence as a member of the same natural kind as its progenitor, then that natural kind or genus would lack stable existence and fail to be comprehensible, also as per (8).

(12) Definition: A virtus is a "natural power," that is, a power essential to the substantial existence of a res and included among its essential properties.

(13) Argument: Per (11) and (12), natura also includes the totality of virtus or natural power.

(14) Definition: Equality (=aequalitas) designates the relationship between a progenitor and an offspring, such that the two are both truly distinct (see 9) and share one and the same natura (see 10) and so all essential and substantial properties.

(15) Argument: "Every child, according to natural birth, is the equality (=aequalitas) of its parent." (De synodis 73).

In other words, the relationship of equality is fully constitutive of the existence of both child and parent qua child and parent, such that both child and parent can and must be described and defined, at least qua child and parent, as subsistent (that is, enduring, existing, rationally comprehensible) relations.

(15.1) Given (11) above, the only thing essentially and substantially distinguishing offspring from parent is the relationship between the two, which per (14) is designated by equality.

(15.2) Given that equality involves the true distinction of the two participants (see 9), this relation is all that is necessary to distinguish the two terms of the relation.

(15.3) Given (15.1) and (15.2), the only thing essentially and substantially distinguishing child and parent is the relation of equality. It therefore essentially and substantially constitutes their relation as child and parent.

(15.4) Furthermore, given that the relationship of procreation is fundamentally a relationship of origination, by which one entity produces another, there is a fundamental sense in which that relation constitutes not only the existence of the child qua child, but the existence of the child simpliciter, which is to say, the existence of the child merely as a res.

(15.5) Likewise, given that for the progenitor procreation extends the stable, essential existence of their own res and grants it a substantiality and essentiality otherwise lacking, there is at least one sense in which the relation of equality also constitutes the existence of the parent, not merely qua parent, but qua substance, qua essence, and therefore qua existence in a fundamental sense.

(16) Conclusion: All human persons without exception are equal (=aequalis, ἴσος) to one another in the sense given in (14).

(16.1) All human persons participate in the process of procreation as defined in (9) either as offspring alone or as both offspring and progenitor, and therefore participate in the relation of equality in a constitutive way with at least some other persons.

(16.2) All human persons belong to the natural kind "human being," which is defineable and knowable only in light of the essentia and substantia and natura whose res exists stably and is known through the process of procreation, and therefore through the relation of equality.

(16.2) Per Scripture and Tradition and dogmatic teaching, all human persons without exception are descended from one original human being, and therefore are related to one another through the relation of procreation, and therefore are equal to one another.

Part Two: That This Equality Has Necessary Implications For Society and Politics

(1) Postulate: Societies consist of human persons.

(2) Postulate: Societies and institutions can be said to exist and subsist and therefore be rationally comprehensible only in a manner analogous to natural res.

(3) Postulate: All societies, including political societies, are formed out of entities that are themselves constituted to a large extent by their direct relations as offspring and progenitor, and therefore by the relationship of equality. 

(4) Postulate: Per I. above, all societies, including political societies, are formed out of entities that are equal to one another in essence, nature, and natural power (virtus).

(5) Argument: The existence of political, social, or religious offices, institutions, and societies as stably existing, rationally comprehensible entities is likewise necessarily dependent on relationships of equality.

(5.1) The constitutive relationship between child and parent is analogous to the          relationship between (political, social, or religious) predecessor and successor inasmuch as both extend the existence of the office, institution, and society over time in such a way as to give it (analogously) substantial, essential existence and make it rationally comprehensible. 

(5.2) Therefore, the existence of all political, social, or religious offices, institutions, and societies is dependent for existence, stability, and knowability on the equality of predecessors and successors. 

(5.3) Political, social, and religious societies are analogous to natural kinds. 

(5.4) Therefore, all political, social, and religious societies exist in a stable and comprehensible fashion only inasmuch as all members without exception share some (analogous) essence in common. 

(5.5) Hence, all political social, and religious societies exist and are rationally knowable only inasmuch as the members are equal to one another.

Part Three: That God is Defined by Equality Between the Persons of the Holy Trinity

(1) Postulate: God may be defined as a res that exists and subsists in the maximal way, such that he not only tends toward, but actually achieves, eternal, stable existence and total rational knowability.

(2) Postulate: Therefore, God may be defined as the only res for which res is absolutely synonymous with essentia and substantia.

(3) Postulate: Given (1) and (2), there is a direct relationship between God and the fundamental metaphysical categories ascribeable to all res, and therefore it is both possible and fruitful to reason about God by analogy from created beings and natural kinds, especially human persons. 

(4): Argument: Given the above, and given that as established in I. natura is fundamentally synonymous with essentia and substantia, and given that, as Hilary argues in I.3 above, natura, like essentia and substantia, is able to be predicated of every res whatsoever, it is reasonable that God be equated with natura also, and therefore be defined necessarily by a procreative relationship.

(5) Argument: In applying the terms Father and Son to God the Father and God the Son, the Scriptures and Tradition intend to assert that the necessarily concomitant sense of equality described in (I.14) is the defining feature of the relationship between Father and Son.

(5.1) God is incapable of deliberate deception, and aims fundamentally at the salvation of all human persons. 

(5.2) Given (5.1), God uses in their natural significations the essential words of the Sacraments necessary for salvation. 

(5.3) The confession of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit belongs to the necessary words and actions of the Sacrament of Baptism and therefore is necessary for salvation. 

(5.4) Therefore God in designating himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is using the terms "father" and "son" in their natural significations: that is, to designate fundamentally the relationship of natural equality. (See Ad Constantium)

(5.5) Moreover, the Scriptures (Philippians 2:6-11, John 5:18) in fact designate the relation between Father and Son by the term equal (=aequalis, ἴσος), and in Philippians connect this with being "in the form (=essentia, οὐσία) of God," while in John this is treated as the logical, natural consequence of Christ "calling God his Father." (See De Trinitate)

(6) Argument: If the Father and Son are in fact equal in even an analogous sense to that given of human persons in I., they are necessarily equal in a maximal, absolute sense, inapplicable to any other entities.

(6.1) Since Father and Son by procreation share a single natura that includes all essential properties, and since in God there is no distinction between res and essentia, the natura conveyed to Son by the Father in the process of procreation necessarily makes the Son God in the fullest possible sense. 

(6.2) Besides substantial and essential properties, all created res possess various accidental properties, which lead to differences among human persons that are not rooted in substance and essence. 

(6.3) God does not possess any accidental properties; hence, it is impossible for Father and Son to differ in any way whatsoever. 

(6.4) In particular, since virtus or natural power is an essential property, and since all accidental powers or accidental differences in the exercise of natural powers are excluded from the definition of God, it is impossible for Father and Son to differ in power.

(7) Argument: The Father cannot exist without the Son, and so cannot precede the Son in existence. 

(7.1) Given the analogy with human equality, it is reasonable to define the Son as the equality of the Father, and hence as constituted qua Son by his relationship with the Father; it is also reasonable to see the Father as constituted qua Father by his relation with the Son. 

(7.2) However, there is in Father and Son no possibility of distinction between essential existence, existence simpliciter, and existence qua Father and qua Son. Hence, both Father and Son are fully constituted as such by their relation. 

(7.3) Given (7.1) and (7.3), and even given (6.1) it is impossible for the Father to precede the Son in any way, and especially impossible and even inconceivable that he could precede the Son in the temporal sense in which human fathers precede sons. 

(7.4) Moreover, to be essentia in the sense ascribed to God is per (1) to actually exist eternally; therefore the Son actually exists eternally in the maximal possible sense; hence, the Father cannot precede him in existence.

(7) Conclusion: The Father and Son are truly distinct, possess one and the same substance, essence, and nature, are co-eternal with one another, do not differ in any way in essence, substance, nature, glory, power, or honor, and are absolutely equal and consubstantial (=ὁμοούσιος) to one another.