Honor is not the highest thing; it is not even really a complete thing in itself. Nevertheless, it is in the final balance necessary for the stable achievement of any degree of virtue or morality in life.
What We Want
Philosophically speaking, there is no question about what we want. What Aristotle knew is also what Augustine knew, what Aquinas knew, what even Descartes knew: that our very nature as rational embodied beings has inscribed in our flesh and in our hearts and every feature of our selves a desire that can be diverted and opposed, but never effaced.
Put philosophically, our moment-by-moment existence as individuals is constituted by our rational and embodied receiving of and participation in being as form: therefore, we cannot help but want to completely fulfill that being by receiving and participating in form and being in their objective fullness. Put simply, as beings who know and enjoy, we cannot help wanting to know and enjoy everything.
More immediately, since our existence at every moment and in its totality is entirely defined by our reception of being as form, we cannot help wanting our reception of being to be true. Truth and intellect are properly the same relation. We exist by knowing the truth; and it is self-contradictory to want to know the truth and at the same time reject it.
Hence, our nature contains within itself the constant, pressing imperative to know each thing it receives truly, objectively, according to what that thing is in itself and not merely as it appears to our senses or preferences or lesser desires, and to relate to it truly, which is to say to relate to it by the relation of truth, which is to say, to act in regards to it according to what it is and what it is for.
For both of these reasons, as Plato long ago pointed out, it is incomprehensible nonsense to say that it can ever be beneficial to us, can ever even be rationally thinkable and not a self-contradiction in terms, to deliberately believe what is false or do what is evil.
Yet as Plato knew also, there is another part of us that is not constituted simply and totally by intellect and truth--another part that has desires that are not solely objective workings-out of the desire to know and enjoy everything. For Plato, this other part of us--which we might call the body, though there are better names for it--was the problem, and the solution was to permanently shed it.
Aristotle, though, rejected this position, and proposed a middle course that also corresponds to more or less the common sense of the human race and the normative Christian position of the last two thousand years. This other part of us, Aristotle acknowledged, was not simply and totally constituted by the relation of truth in the same way as the intellect; it was, however, ordered to that relation, its nature constituted totally by a telos and receptivity towards receiving truth from the intellect and embodying that truth in objective and embodied and temporal actions. Or, put more simply, our human bodies are not intellects, but things that exist to be taught by the intellect the truth and to follow and live that truth out.
Hence, whatever the ultimate fate of the body or soul might be in the afterlife, the entire task of morality in this life is for the intellect to teach truth to the body in such a way and to such a degree that it comes to continually and stably share in and embody and carry out the relation of truth in respect to every thing it encounters.
Or, put more incisively, the whole goal of human morality is to establish a permanent and unbreakable bond between body and soul, such that every truth grasped by the intellect is infallibly lived out by the body. This stable bond Aristotle called a "habit" or "excellence," but it is better known today by the Latin term "virtue."
If all this is correct, then there is simply no question what you want, what I want, what you and I cannot help but wanting. We want to always and everywhere infallibly do what is objectively true and good, which is to say, what in fact corresponds to the natures and telos and happiness of every thing and every person we encounter.
Here, though, is the whole trouble: that if we want this, we do not always or even often know what we want. Different reasons for this gap have been given in human history. For Plato, the problem was merely ignorance; for Aristotle, it was habitual vice, a poor use of the body and the embodied mind; for many Christian philosophers, it was both of the above and also the perverse will of a prideful intellect seeking its own self and lesser finalities above the terrifying transcendence of a God who is both the proper end of the intellect and infinitely beyond its capacity to grasp or choose by its powers alone.
All, though, would agree that virtue and truth and the good are the objective ends of our bodies and minds and whole selves, and that therefore we in some sense want them even when we oppose them, even when we in fact choose their opposites.
Interiority and Politics
This is what the Apostles called a hard saying; that is, a saying that does not appear at first glance to give much aid or comfort to our actual pitiful lives and selves. To tell a child who very much wants to hit his sister that he in fact wants to love her is, I think, true; but also not much of a comfort to the child's delicate feelings of offended dignity at not being allowed to do what he wants.
We all are much more like that child than we would like to think; and much more of our emotional lives consist of delicate feelings of offended dignity over not being allowed to do and say the manifestly stupid and harmful things we happen to want in the moment. And it is in respect to this reality that it is often more truthful merely to say that the heart of man is desperately wicked above all things, who can fathom it--and then to punish the child and/or ourselves.
There is, however, a practicality in the belief that what we really want is always and everywhere the objective good--though it is rarely put in a practical form.
From this comes the basic conflict between modern and pre-modern accounts of desire. For the ancients and Medievals, desire was conceived of objectively, as beginning with the objective good eliciting desire in the subject, conforming that subject's appetite to itself, and terminating in the subject's enjoyment of the object by way of proper relation. For moderns since the 16th century, however, desire has been conceived as beginning with the subject, as an inchoate and irrational and limitless impulse outwards that only subjectively takes its objects as good and in so doing forces those objects to conform to itself, and hence which terminates in the violent subjection or subjugation of object to appetite.
Yet if one thinks of desire as essentially limitless and subjective, then one necessarily thinks of both morality and politics as primarily about reconciling the essentially opposed and limitless desires and (in the technical sense) interests of individual people and groups, and thus making it possible for people to live together in some form of society. And the only way to do this, for all the cleverness of Enlightenment thinkers, is via some form of discipline and extrinsic imposition of hostile ends onto the subjective desires of individual people. If this is true, then morality will be conceived of most essentially as a form of violence. And we can see this quite well in all contemporary approaches to law and morality.
If it does nothing else, the belief in the objectivity of the good and of people's desire for it has a profound effect on the character and actions of the person tasked with training others to choose the good--placing love at the heart of punishment, and desire at the heart of education. If it is really true, as more or less every philosopher and Christian theologian from Aristotle until the Reformation thought it was, that the goal of governance and parenting and education alike is to create a permanent, habitual inner bond between truth and self and body and soul and cause people to reliably and freely choose the good, we would frame both laws and curricula rather differently than we presently do.
Of course, the belief that what people really and truly want is the good does not necessarily dictate a gentle or indulgent method of training or moral education--far from it! We tend as a matter of course to be much less indulgent and much more consistently demanding in seeking what we genuinely believe that we want than in what we think others want for us; and the same applies, mutatis mutandis, to helping other people seek what they want. The belief in a purely extrinsic imposition of the good tends to lead to an odd fluctuation between total indulgence and indeed indifference to conduct on the one hand, and extraordinarily coercive and violent attempts to punish and compel conduct on the other. The reason for this is simple: if people's character and choice only matter, not to themselves, but to society and/or the government and/or some private interest, then the reality is that the vast majority of people's conduct and moral character and virtue and vice simply does not matter. Where it does matter, though, the only method of proceeding is to use whatever means necessary to force them to do what those with power want or need them to do; and in this, their moral character and choices and even free will is mostly beside the point.
On the other hand, belief in the objectivity of the good and our own constitutional desire for it imposes on each person and on society collectivity an imperative that is constant and totalizing--but which is limited, not extrinsically, but intrinsically by the thing aimed at (the interior, stable, habitual choice of each individual person of the objective truth of their relations with all other persons and things) and the means necessary to achieve those ends (habit-forming interior human desire and action).
The implications of all this are limitless, moment by moment and day by day; and until one has actually tried to live out this way of doing and being, there is little that can be comprehensibly said to the outsider.
I really do believe that if we could untangle all our manifold and petty and perverse desires and wishes and habits, it is true that we would ultimately discover that at the root of them all lies the infinite receptivity of the intellect for the fullness of truthful being and objective goodness. I have, to a reasonable extent, succeeded in untangling my own moment-by-moment desires and choices and emotions and discovering their ultimate roots in the objective good; and in discovering this, I have succeeded to a certain degree in altering those moment-by-moment desires and choices and emotions so as to better conform them with their ends.
In doing this, though, I have also and inevitably come to notice the degree to which my moment-by-moment daily desires and wishes and enjoyments were and still to an extent are irrational and perverse and self-contradictory, not relative to some violently imposed external standard, but relative to their own aims and in themselves. And all of this is not easy.
Yet if one has never even attempted this struggle, has never even conceived of one's desires and choices in these terms however inchoately, I struggle to understand how one could be expected to understand the good--or, really, meaningfully desire or enjoy it. The whole task is in the doing.

